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NOTES
Employment Discrimination-Defining an Employer's Liability
Under Title VH for On-the-Job Sexual Harassment:
Adoption of a Bifurcated Standard
Sexual harassment has been characterized as the "most widespread prob-
lem women face in the workforce."' Such harassment constitutes a real eco-
nomic barrier to career advancement by women,2 especially in nontraditional
jobs.3 Moreover, it can inflict significant emotional and psychological injury
upon the victim. 4 In response to this growing problem,5 federal courts uni-
formly recognize a cause of action against the employer for sexual harass-
ment 6 under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 7 The courts have failed,
however, to agree on the appropriate standard of employer liability for acts of
harassment by supervisory personnel and instead have employed three distinct
standards.8 One standard imposes strict liability on the employer for all acts
of harassment by a supervisor,9 the second imposes liability only after a show-
1. Sex Discrimination in the Workplace, 1981: Hearings Before the Senate Comm on Labor
and Human Resources, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 518 (1981) (statement of Karen Sauvigne, Program
Director of the Working Women's Institute) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
2. The vast majority of reported sexual harassment cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 involve the harassment of a female employee by a male supervisor or coworker. A
male employee subject to sexual harassment, however, might enjoy the same Title VII protections.
Rasnic, The Evolvement of an Action for Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 26 ST. Louis U.L.J.
875, 876 (1982). See diso Wright v. Methodist Youth Servs., 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. IU. 1981)
(male employee terminated for refusing advances of homosexual male supervisor has Title VII
claim against employer).
The economic consequences are readily apparent when an employee is fired, demoted, or
denied promotion for refusing the advances of a supervisor. Less-apparent economic loss is
caused by the diminished productivity of the victim. Hearings, supra note I, at 523-24 (statement
of Karen Sauvigne).
3. Almost 75% of working women fill jobs in service-oriented positions historically associ-
ated with female employees. C. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A
CASE OF SEX DIsCRIMINATION 10 (1979). Such "traditional" jobs include secretarial, teaching,
nursing, and retail sales positions. "Nontraditional" jobs include high status managerial and pro-
fessional positions and blue collar positions in heavy industry, positions historically filled by male
employees. Id. at 10-I1.
4. The psychological and emotional injury occasioned by sexual harassment is manifested
largely in the form of increased stress, but also may include intense "feelings of powerlessness,
fear, anger, nervousness, decreased job satisfaction and diminished ambition." Hearings, supra
note 1, at 524 (statement of Karen Sauvigne).
5. Two commentators estimate that 50 to 80% of all working women have been subject to
some form of on-the-job sexual harassment. See Hill & Behrens, Love in the Office: A Guide for
Dealing with Sexual Harassment Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 30 DEPAUL L.
REv. 581, 581-82 (1981) (citing a comprehensive review of recent surveys of D. NEUGARTEN & J.
SHAFRaTy, SEXUALITY 1N ORGANIZATIONS (1980)).
6. See, eg., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (1lth Cir. 1982); Miller v. Bank of
Am., 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Tompkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d
Cir. 1977); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Garber v. Saxon Business Prods., Inc.,
552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
8. C. MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 58.
9. See Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
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ing that the employer had actual or constructive knowledge of the harassment
and failed to remedy the situation;10 the third, recently adopted by the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, is a bifurcated standard that imposes strict liability
for forms of harassment involving some official action by the supervisor, but
uses the knowledge standard when official action is lacking.II This note ana-
lyzes each standard and concludes that the bifurcated standard offers the most
realistic and effective means to combat on-the-job sexual harassment.
Sexual harassment is "the unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in
the context of a relationship of unequal power."' 2 In an employment situa-
tion, it concerns an unwelcome and offensive advance, statement, or other ac-
tion of a sexual nature that interferes with an employee's ability to perform a
job and pursue a career.
13
The cases and commentary have devoted little discussion to establishing
criteria for defining acts that constitute actionable sexual harassment, largely
because the litigated incidents involve only the most blatant harassment.
14
Moreover, because of the subjective analysis of harassment employed by the
courts,15 future cases necessarily will remain fact sensitive and are unlikely to
provide any concrete definitions. 16 One commentator, however, has presented
ten elements to consider in determining whether particular behavior is unlaw-
ful sexual harassment: the severity of the conduct; the number and frequency
of the encounters; the relationship between the parties; any provocation by the
victim; the response of the victim to the conduct; the apparent reaction of the
victim; the general working environment; the location of the conduct (in a
public or private place); and the male-female ratio in the workplace. 17
However defined, sexual harassment now is recognized as a form of sex
10. See Tompkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
11. See Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897
(llth Cir. 1982).
12. C. MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 1.
13. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission defined "sexual harassment" as:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such
conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's
employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as
the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1983). This definition has been criticized as too broad to provide any
effective guidance to employers dealing with alleged acts of sexual harassment. See Linenberger,
What Behavior Constitutes Sexual Harassment?, 34 LAB. L.J. 238, 242-43 (1983).
14. Linenberger, supra note 13, at 238.
15. An act is deemed offensive based on the subjective perceptions of the victim, if reason-
able, rather than on any objective standard. See Linenberger, supra note 13, at 242; Comment,
Sexual Harassment and Title VII-Female Employees' Claim Alleging Verbal and Physlcal Ad-
vances by a Male Supervisor Dismissed as Nonactionable-Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 51
N.Y.U. L. REv. 148, 162 (1976).
16. Linenberger, supra note 13, at 238.
17. Id. at 246-47.
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discrimination prohibited by Title VII.L 8 Title VII does not contain an express
provision concerning sexual harassment, and its prohibition of sex discrimina-
tion was added by Congress, with little debate,'
9 just prior to enactment.20
Without legislative history for guidance, federal courts initially disagreed
whether Title VII provided a cause of action for on-the-job sexual harassment.
The first case considering the issue, Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. ,21 con-
cluded that sexual harassment was a mere "personal proclivity, peculiarity or
mannerism"2 2 of the supervisor and did not create liability for the employer
under Title VII. Until 1977, this analysis prevailed in the district courts.
23
Prior to 1977, only one district court had ruled that sexual harassment was
actionable under Title VII. In Williams v. Saxbe24 the District Court for the
District of Columbia considered the Title VII claim of a female employee dis-
charged from the Justice Department 25 for refusing to submit to the advances
of her supervisor. The court ruled that sexual harassment is "an artificial bar-
18. Section 703(a) of Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(l) to fail or refuse to hire
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or
classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or na-
tional origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).
19. The prohibition against sex discrimination was added by a floor amendment submitted
by Rep. Smith on February 8, 1964. 110 CONG. REc. 2577 (1964). Rep. Smith was an opponent
of Title VII and his amendment was considered an attempt to confuse the purpose of Title VII as
a means to defeat the bill. See id at 2581 (remarks of Rep. Green). The House of Representatives
adopted the amendment without a hearing and with little debate. Id. at 2582, 2804.
20. Title VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 255 (1964).
21. 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacatedmen, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
22. Come, 390 F. Supp. at 163.
23. See, e.g., Tompkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976),
rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976),
rev'd, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
24. 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'dsub nor. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir.
1978). The reversal was on the procedural grounds that the district court considered only the
administrative record in reaching a judgment, rather than conducting a new trial as mandated by
Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 (1976).
25. Although federal employees initially were excluded from Title VII, coverage was pro-
vided by a 1972 amendment:
(a) All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment (except with
regard to aliens employed outside the limits of the United States) in military depart-
ments,. . . in executive agencies,. . . in the United States Postal Service and the Postal
Rate Commission, in those units of the Government of the District of Columbia having
positions in the competitive service, and in those units of the legislative and judicial
branches of the Federal Government having positions in the competitive service, and in
the Library of Congress shall be made free from any discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 11(a), 86 Stat. 111 (1972)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). This amendment provides private
and federal employees with identical Title VII protection. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 988
(D.C. Cir. 1977) ("It is beyond cavil that Congress legislated for federal employees essentially the
same guarantees against sex discrimination that previously it had afforded private employees.").
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rier to employment which was placed before one gender and not the other. '26
This barrier qualified as a condition of employment and, because imposed
only on one gender, violated Title VII.
27
Three federal courts of appeals adopted the Williams analysis in 1977.
Each of the cases, Barnes v. Costle,28 Tompkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas
Co. ,29 and Garber v. Saxon Business Products, Inc. ,30 involved a female em-
ployee fired for refusing her supervisor's sexual advances. In each case the
courts found that submission to sexual advances was a condition of employ-
ment imposed on the employee because of her sex. Title VII clearly prohibits
such a condition. Since 1977, two more courts of appeals have recognized this
cause of action: the Ninth Circuit in Miller v. Bank ofAmerica 3' and the Elev-
enth Circuit in Henson v. City of Dundee.32 No circuit has refused to recognize
the cause of action.
33
The Henson court clearly enumerated the elements of a Title VII sexual
harassment claim. To establish a claim, plaintiff must show: (1) "[t]he em-
ployee belongs to a protected group"; 34 (2) "the employee was subject to un-
welcome sexual harassment";35 (3) "[t]he harassment complained of was based
upon sex"; 36 (4) "[t]he harassment complained'of affected a term, condition, or
privilege of employment"; 37 and (5) a basis to impose liability on the employer
under some theory of respondeat superior.38 The federal courts are in full
agreement on the first four elements of the claim. It is on the fifth that the
courts disagree; three different standards of respondeat superior are currently
in use. Such a conflict prevents uniform and effective enforcement of Title VII
against on-the-job sexual harassment and must be resolved.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit imposed the most rigid stan-
dard of employer liability: strict liability for all acts of harassment by a super-
visor. In Miller v. Bank ofAmerica39 a female employee claimed that she had
been fired for refusing the sexual demands of her male supervisor.40 The bank
had a long-standing policy against sexual harassment and an effective griev-
ance procedure for reporting violations of this policy. Because the employee
26. Williams, 413 F. Supp. at 657-58.
27. Id. at 659, 661.
28. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
29. 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
30. 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
31. 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
32. 682 F.2d 897 (1lth Cir. 1982).
33. In Fisher v. Flynn, 598 F.2d 663 (1st Cir. 1979), plaintiff alleged a Title VII sexual harass-
ment claim. Plaintiff claimed she was fired from her college teaching position because she had
refused the romantic advances of her department chairman. The court dismissed the claim be-
cause of pleading defects in the complaint.
34. Henson, 682 F.2d at 903.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 904.
38. Id. at 905.
39. 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
40. Id. at 212.
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failed to use this grievence procedure, the bank argued that she had waived
any claims she might have had.4 1 The court of appeals reversed the district
court's dismissal42 of the employee's Title VII claim, ruling that Title VII pro-
vides a cause of action to the employee. The court then established its stan-
dard of employer liability for sexual harassment:
We conclude that respondeat superior does apply here, where the
action complained of was that of a supervisor, authorized to hire,
fire, discipline and promote, or at least to participate in or recom-
mend such actions, even though what the supervisor is said to have
done violates company policy.
43
Thus, the bank was liable for the supervisor's harassing behavior even though
it arguably did not have any knowledge of the behavior.
44
To date, the Miller rule has not been explicitly adopted by any other
court. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), however,
did adopt strict liability in its 1980 guidelines on sexual harassment, ruling that
an employer is liable "for its acts and those of its agents and supervisory em-
ployees with respect to sexual harassment regardless of whether the specific
acts complained of were authorized or even forbidden by the employer and
regardless of whether the employer knew or should have known of their occur-
rence." 45 These guidelines carry no legal authority; they are merely advi-
sory.46 They do, however, represent the official opinion of the agency charged
with enforcing Title V1147 and can significantly influence the courts.
48
The Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) has at-
tempted to incorporate the EEOC guidelines and the EEOC's strict liability
41. Id. at 213.
42. Miller, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'g 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
43. Miller, 600 F.2d at 213.
44. While the opinion in Miller does not mention whether plaintiffs failure to use the bank's
grievance procedure left the bank unaware of the supervisor's behavior, subsequent cases have
assumed that the bank was unaware of this conduct. See, e.g., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 993
n.72 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("official policy of bank to discourage sexual conduct, and bank not advised
of behavior by filing of grievance with Employee Relations Department").
45. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1983).
46. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1976).
48. The Supreme Court has observed that the EEOC employment guidelines generally are
"entitled to great deference" by the courts. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34
(1971). The guidelines, however, are "not entitled to great weight" when they reflect a new policy
unsupported by legislative history or prior judicial construction. Trans World Airlines v. Hardi-
son, 432 U.S. 63, 76 n.l1 (1977); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142-43 (1976).
The guidelines on sexual harassment have received mixed reviews from commentators.
Those advocating the strict liability theory strongly support the guidelines. See Attanasio, Equal
Justice Under Chaos: The Developing Law of Sexual Harassment, 51 U. CIN. L. Rav. 1 (1982);
Comment, New EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex: Employer Liabilityfor Sexual
Harassment Under Title VII, 61 B.U.L. Rav. 535 (1981); Note, Sexual Harassment ofEmployees
Creates Discriminatory Work Environment in Violation of Title VII, 15 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1385
(1981). Other commentators have found the guidelines overly broad and unsupported by judicial
precedent. See Bryan, Sexual Harassment as Unlawful Discrimination Under Title VII ofthe Civil
RightsAct o/'1964, 14 LoY. L.A.L. Rv. 25, 55 (1981); Linenberger, supra note 13, at 242-43;
McLain, The EEOC Sexual Harassment Guidelines: Welcome Advances Under Title VII?, 10 U.
BALT. L. Rav. 275, 322-24 (1981).
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theory into its own regulations governing federal contracts. 49 These regula-
tions would impose contractual obligations to prevent and remedy sexual har-
assment on all businesses holding federal contracts or working on federally
funded construction sites.50 The implementation of these regulations, how-
ever, was suspended in 1981 pending further action.
51
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit apparently has
adopted the strict liability theory as well, although in a modified form. In
Barnes v. Costle52 the court recognized a cause of action against the Environ-
mental Protection Agency under Title VII for discharging an employee who
refused the sexual advances of her supervisor. The court observed that in sex-
ual harassment cases "an employer is chargeable with Title VII violations oc-
casioned by discriminatory practices of supervisory personnel. 5-3 The court
recognized, however, that the employer may be relieved of liability if the su-
pervisor acted contrary to the employer's policies and without the employer's
knowledge and the "consequences are rectified when discovered."'54 The bur-
den of proof is on the employer to establish these grounds for relief from
liability.55
The District of Columbia Circuit rule, however, still may be in a state of
flux. A recent district court opinion rejected strict liability and adopted the
knowledge standard for sexual harassment claims.56 This court found for the
employer because it lacked knowledge of the alleged harassment. 57
The proponents of the strict liability theory have advanced three argu-
ments in its favor. The strongest is that the language of Title VII itself man-
dates strict liability.58 Title VII prohibits sex discrimination, which includes
sexual harassment, by any "employer." 59 Title VII defines the term "em-
ployer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce... and any
49. 41 C.F.R. § 60-20.8 (1981). These regulations were suspended indefinitely in 1981 by the
Reagan administration. 46 Fed. Reg. 42,865 (1981).
50. 45 Fed. Reg. 86,249 (1980).
51. See supra note 49.
52. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
53. Id. at 993.
54. Id.
55. Id. The Barnes standard was repeated in Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943 (D.C. Cir.
1981). See infra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
56. Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37, 42 (D.D.C. 1980). In Pinson an
employee of a savings and loan association charged her employer with violating Title VII by
requiring her to submit to her branch manager's sexual demands and by firing her after she re-
fused to continue meeting these demands. The court ruled for the employer because the employee
had never reported the alleged sexual demands to senior management and the employer demon-
strated a nondiscriminatory reason for firing the employee, her excessive sick leave. Vinson is in
accord with most federal district court opinions on sexual harassment, see infra notes 80-82 and
accompanying text.
57. Vinson, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 41.
58. See Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979); Attanasio, supra note 48, at
32 ("The plain language of the Act imposes liability for discrimination by any agent."); Hill &
Behrens, supra note 5, at 613 ("Title VII includes in its definition of 'employer' any agent of one
who otherwise qualifies as a defendant.").
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).
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agent of such aperson."60 Because a supervisor is the agent of his employer,
his discriminatory acts are covered by Title VII.
Second, as courts consistently have applied strict liability to employers for
a supervisor's acts of racial, ethnic, and religious harassment, 61 some courts
and commentators reason that this standard similarly should apply to a super-
visor's acts of sexual harassment.62 Sex discrimination is prohibited in the
same section of Title VII as these other forms of discrimination and Congress
has indicated that it should be combatted with equal vigor.63 To give effect to
congressional intent, it is argued that the same standard of liability should
apply to sexual harassment as is applied to racial, ethnic, or religious
harassment.
Unfortunately, the cases considering racial, ethnic, or religious harass-
ment have devoted little discussion to the policy rationale for imposing strict
liability.6 Nonetheless, proponents argue that strict liability would create
uniformity under Title VII and provide employees with the same protection
against sexual harassment as is provided against other forms of harassment.
The final argument for strict liability is that it would provide the victim of
sexual harassment with maximum legal protection. Strict liability is consid-
ered essential to ensure that employers do not ignore the problem by hiding
behind their ignorance of particular incidents.65 Moreover, the employer con-
trols the general employment situation and the particular supervisor; there-
fore, the employer is in the best position to prevent the occurrence of
harassment. 66 Strict liability is deemed an essential incentive to compel em-
ployers to prevent such harassment.
Strict liability also is considered fair to the employer since it imposes no
undue burden. Even if totally unaware of the harassment, the employer is
unlikely to suffer an adverse judgment if it acts promptly to remedy the situa-
60. Id. § 2000e(b) (emphasis added).
61. See, e.g., Calcote v. Texas Educ. Found., 578 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1978) (racial harassment);
Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1977) (ethnic harass-
ment); Young v. Southwestern Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975) (religious harass-
ment); Lucero v. Beth Isr. Hosp. & Geriatric Center, 479 F. Supp. 452 (D. Colo. 1979) (racial
harassment); Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (religious harassment).
62. See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 992-93 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Hearings, supra note 1, at
350-51 (statement of J. Clay Smith, Jr., Acting EEOC Chairman); C. MACKJNNON, supra note 3,
at 93-94; Bryan, supra note 48, at 45-47.
63. "Discrimination against women is no less serious than other forms of prohibited discrimi-
natory practices and is to be accorded the same degree of social concern given to any type of
unlawful discrimination." H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
CONO. & AD. NEws 2137, 2141.
64. One court concluded that the statutory language of Title VII required strict liability for
racially motivated harassment of white hospital employees by their black supervisor, see Lucero v.
Beth Isr. Hosp. & Geriatric Center, 479 F. Supp. 453, 455 (D. Colo. 1979) (citing Miller v. Bank of
Am., 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979)). Another court adopted strict liability on policy grounds.
See Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976). In Compston an employer was
held strictly liable for the antisemitic comments of a supervisor: "When a person vested with
managerial responsibilities embarks upon a course of conduct calculated to demean an employee
before his fellows because of the employee's professed religious views, such activity will necessar-
ily have the effect of altering the conditions of his employment." Id. at 160-61.
65. C. MACKiNNON, supra note 3, at 211.
66. Id. at 93.
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tion because the EEOC has stated that it will not pursue a case if the employer
provides a suitable remedy on its own initiative.67 The employee may be will-
ing to accept the remedial action as a settlement and abandon his or her indi-
vidual case.68 Should the case go to trial, the employer may obtain a dismissal
due to mootness, as the relief sought already had been provided, or suffer only
a nominal judgment because it had mitigated the employee's damages.
69
Furthermore, the strict liability standard will not subject the employer to
Title VII liability for every ill-timed pass or flirtation by a supervisor, as some
courts have claimed.70 Such behavior is purely personal to the supervisor and
is beyond the coverage of Title VII.71 The employer is liable under Title VII
only when the supervisor uses "his power as a supervisor to affect the
subordinate's employment status in an effort to obtain compliance with his
sexual advance," 72 or when his behavior is sufficiently offensive and pervasive
to constitute an offensive work environment. 73 Until the behavior reaches one
of these levels, Title VII liability cannot exist.
The second standard for employer liability, the actual or constructive
knowledge standard, was promulgated in Tompkins v. Public Service Electric &
Gas Co. ,74 one of the first appellate court decisions considering sexual harass-
ment. The supervisor in Tompkins informed a female employee during a job
performance review session that she must accede to his sexual demands if they
were to maintain a "satisfactory working relationship." 75 The employee re-
ported these demands to senior management and requested a transfer to an-
other department. After promising her a transfer to a similar job,
management personnel assigned her to an inferior position and later fired
her.
76
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in reversing the dismissal of
the employee's complaint by the district court,77 established the actual or con-
structive knowledge test:
[W]e conclude that Title VII is violated when a supervisor, with the
actual or constructive knowledge of the employer, makes sexual ad-
67. This means where an employer knows of acts of sexual harassment which have been
committed by a supervisor or an agent and rectifies the actual results of those actions, a
further remedy under Title VII would be unlikely in the administrative process. Clearly,
the Commission would not sue for a remedy which has already been granted.
Hearings, supra note I, at 351 (statement of J. Clay Smith, Jr., Acting EEOC Chairman).
68. See Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211, 214 (9th Cir. 1979).
69. Attanasio, supra note 48, at 34-36.
70. See, e.g., Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975) ("[A]n
outgrowth of holding such activity to be actionable under Title VII would be a potential federal
lawsuit every time any employee made amorous or sexually oriented advances toward another."),
vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
71. Bryan, supra note 48, at 46-47.
72. Id. at 47.
73. See infra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
74. 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
75. Id. at 1045.
76. Id. at 1046.
77. Tompkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas. Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977), rep , 422 F.
Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976).
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vances or demands toward a subordinate employee and conditions
that employee's job status--evaluation, continued employment, pro-
motion, or other aspects of career development--on a favorable re-
sponse to those advances or demands, and the employer does not
take prompt and appropriate remedial action after acquiring such
knowledge.
78
The employer acquires actual knowledge when management personnel are in-
formed of the harassment through employee complaints or other forms of in-
tra-office communication. Participation by management in the harassment
itself also may create actual knowledge. Constructive knowledge will be in-
ferred if the harassment is so open and pervasive that the employer can be
presumed to know of it.
79
The knowledge standard has been favored by most district courts consid-
ering sexual harassment cases.80 In Meyers v. I TT .Diverspfed Credit Corp. ,81
for example, a Missouri federal district court concluded that "in order to im-
pose liability on an employer for the discriminatory acts of its supervisor, the
plaintiff must make the additional showing that the employer had actual or
constructive knowledge of the discriminatory acts of its supervisor and did
nothing to rectify the situation."
82
The knowledge standard of liability is unique to sexual harassment cases;
all other forms of Title VII discrimination by supervisory personnel have been
adjudicated under the strict liability theory.83 Proponents of the knowledge
standard argue that sexual harassment is a unique form of discrimination and,
therefore, is entitled to its own standard of liability.
The arguments favoring the knowledge standard, based largely on policy
considerations, are articulated clearly in Judge MacKinnon's concurring opin-
ion in Barnes v. Costle. 84 Although Judge MacKinnon agreed that the Barnes
employer should be held liable, he rejected the majority's views on strict lia-
bility8" and presented his analysis favoring the knowledge standard. Judge
MacKinnon asserted that strict liability has been applied to Title VII cases for
three reasons: (1) the employer is in the best position to explain the discrimina-
tory behavior; (2) the employer, as master of the workplace, is in the best posi-
tion to control and eliminate the discrimination; and (3) "the type of conduct
78. Tompkins, 568 F.2d at 1048-49 (emphasis added).
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., Meyers v. I.T.T. Diversified Credit Corp., 527 F. Supp. 1064, 1068 (E.D. Mo.
1981); Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37, 42 (D.D.C. 1980); Ludington v.
Sambo's Restaurants, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 480 (E.D. Wisc. 1979); Neidhardt v. D.H. Holmes Co., 21
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 452, 468 (E.D. La. 1979); Heelan v. Johns-Manville, Inc., 451 F.
Supp. 1382, 1389 (D. Colo. 1978); Munford v. James T. Barnes & Co., 441 F. Supp. 459, 466 (E.D.
Mich. 1977).
81. 527 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Mo. 1981) (employer liable under Title VII for firing employee
who had complained of supervisory sexual harassment and for failing to investigate those
complaints).
82. Id. at 1068.
83. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
84. 561 F.2d 983, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (MacKinnon, J., concurring).
85. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
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at issue is questionable at best, and it is not undesirable to induce careful em-
ployers to err on the side of avoiding possible violative conduct."86 He then
argued that none of these rationales apply in the sexual harassment situation.
First, the employer is not in a position to know of, much less explain,
cases of sexual harassment. Such harassment is "seldom a public matter"
87
and easily can occur outside the work place.88 Sexual harassment, because of
its private nature, does not have to be performed publicly to be effective.
Moreover, certain forms of sexual harassment, such as sexual advances, are
more effective when performed privately. As such, it is the employee, rather
than the employer, who is most able to detect, report, and explain acts of sex-
ual harassment. While racial, ethnic, and religious harassment also can be
performed privately, they generally are more humiliating to the victim when
performed publicly.
For similar reasons, the employer is often in no position to control the
harassment as it occurs.89 Again, most harassment occurs privately and, as
such, is difficult to monitor and control. Judge MacKinnon did note that the
employer can act to control harassment to some degree by voicing a strong
policy against harassment, providing an effective and anonymous grievance
procedure for reporting violations of this policy, and acting promptly to disci-
pline the offending supervisor upon receipt of a valid complaint.90 Even with
such a procedure, however, the first step of reporting the harassment remains
with the employee.
Finally, Judge MacKinnon argued that sexual harassment, unlike other
forms of harassment, does not involve behavior that is "intrinsically offen-
sive." 91 While all racial, ethnic, and religious harassment is offensive, all sex-
ual advances are not. In cases of sexual advances, "it is the abuse of the
practice, rather than the practice itself," that creates grounds for objection and
forms the basis for a Title VII claim. 92
For these reasons, Judge MacKinnon concluded that sexual harassment
should be treated differently than other forms of discrimination under Title
VII and is entitled to a distinct standard of liability. He considered the knowl-
edge standard to be the fairest to the employer and to the employee. The em-
ployer is not liable for conduct of which it is unaware and over which it can
exert little prior control.93 Once informed, it can act promptly to rectify the
86. Barnes, 561 F.2d at 998 (MacKinnon, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 999 (MacKinnon, J., concurring).
88. This was the case in Tompkins; the supervisor made his demands while talking to the
employee in a restaurant. Tompkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1045 (3d Cir.
1977).
89. See Barnes, 561 F.2d at 1000 (MacKinnon, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 1000-01 (MacKinnon, J., concurring).
91. Id. at 1001 (MacKinnon, J., concurring).
92. Id. (MacKinnon, J., concurring). The EEOC has echoed this position: "[Tihe same ac-
tions which, under one set of circumstances, would constitute sexual harassment, might under
another set of circumstances, constitute acceptable social behavior." Hearings, supra note 1, at
348-49 (statement of J. Clay Smith, Jr., Acting Director of the EEOC).
93. See Conte & Gregory, Sexual Harassment in Employment-Some Proposals Toward More
Realistic Standards of Liability, 32 DRAKE L. REV. 
402, 411 n.18 (1982-83).
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employee's injury and avoid liability. If it fails to act in this manner, liability
will be imposed. No undue burden is placed on the employee, who can easily
notify the employer of the harassment through a grievance procedure or any
other form of communication to management.
94
One commentator has suggested that this standard will combat sexual
harassment more effectively than the strict liability standard.95 The knowl-
edge standard provides the employer with a real incentive to rectify acts of
harassment immediately after notification to avoid subsequent liability. Under
the strict liability standard, liability is imposed when the harassing act occurs;
subsequent remedial action by the employer will not extinguish this liability.
Hence, the employer lacks the incentive to provide a remedy on its own initia-
tive. Moreover, the employer actually may be reluctant, even unwilling, to
remedy the harassment because this might be viewed as an admission of guilt
in subsequent litigation.96 By this analysis, the knowledge standard, not the
strict liability standard, provides the more effective tool to combat harassment.
These arguments in favor of the knowledge standard, however, are based
on policy considerations alone and largely ignore the language of Title VII.
Nonetheless, such an approach may be justifiable because of the limited legis-
lative history on sex discrimination in general and the absence of legislative
history on sexual harassment.97 Because the courts, not Congress, recognized
sexual harassment as actionable under Title VII, the courts have claimed the
right to define the parameters of that cause of action.
The bifurcated standard of liability recognizes that sexual harassment ex-
ists in two forms. The early sexual harassment cases concerned only quidpro
quo harassment in which the supervisor demanded sexual favors in exchange
for continued employment and advancement. Recently, however, courts have
recognized that a supervisor can perform harassment without demanding a
quidpro quo from the employee. For example, the supervisor could make
repeated derogatory or suggestive comments about the employee's sex or sexu-
ality, which creates an offensive work environment for the employee.9 8 This
type of harassment was recognized as a distinct form of prohibited sexual har-
assment inBundy v. Jackson. 99 InBundy plaintiff was never fired, demoted, or
denied promotion by the employer for refusing her superviso:r's repeated sex-
ual demands; she still was fully employed when suit was brought.1 00 Never-
theless, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that
94. Id. at 412 n.18.
95. See Bryan, supra note 48, at 52.
96. Id. See also Hearings, supra note 1, at 568-72 (statement of Kenneth MeCulloch, attor-
ney, Townley & Updike) (knowledge standard encourages resolution of harassment through inter-
nal grievance procedures rather than through costly litigation).
97. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
98. This concept ofquidpro quo and hostile work environment harassment was first articu-
lated by Catherine MacKinnon. MacKinnon strongly supported the strict liability theory for all
acts of sexual harassment by a supervisor and argued that the two forms of harassment should not
be subject to separate theories of liability. See C. MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 211, 237.
99. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
100. Id. at 940-41.
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sexual harassment as a regular condition of the plaintiff's employment violated
Title VII.101 The court remanded the case for determination of appropriate
injunctive relief.
102
The post-Bundy courts of appeals decisions on sexual harassment have
recognized the distinction between quidpro quo and offensive work environ-
ment harassment and have adopted separate standards of employer liability
for each. In the first of these cases, Henson v. City of Dundee,10 3 the employee,
a female radio dispatcher for a municipal police department, alleged that she
had been subjected to repeated sexual demands by the chief of police and also
had been denied admission to the police academy by the chief for refusing
these demands.' 04
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, relying on Bundy, found
that the repeated sexual advances had created an offensive work environment
in violation of Title VII.105 The court held that the actual or constructive
knowledge standard of employer liability applied to this type of harassment:
"Where, as here, the plaintiff seeks to hold the employer responsible for the
hostile work environment created by the plaintiffs supervisor or coworker, she
must show that the employer knew or should have known of the harassment in
question and failed to take prompt remedial action."'
06
After resolving the offensive work environment claim, the court addressed
the second charge. The court found that Henson had been barred from at-
tending the police academy by the police chief for refusing his sexual demands
and that this action was quidpro quo harassment.'0 7 The City was held
strictly liable for this form of harassment: "We hold that an employer is
strictly liable for the actions of its supervisors that amount to sexual harass-
ment resulting in tangible job detriment to the subordinate employee."'108
To justify this bifurcated standard, the court analyzed the differences be-
tween the two forms of harassment. The supervisor does not use his authority
as supervisor to create an offensive work environment. His actions are identi-
cal to those of a coworker and should be subject to the same standard of em-
ployer liability used in coworker harassment cases, the actual or constructive
knowledge standard. 0 9
101. Id. at 943-44. The Bundy court relied heavily upon Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972), which held that an employer violated Title VII by
creating a racially discriminatory work atmosphere which caused psychological, but not economic,
injury to the employee. Bundy has been much praised by commentators. See Note, Expanding
Title VII to Prohibit a Sexualy Harassing Work Environment, 70 GEo. L.J. 345 (1981); Note,
Eliminating the Need to Prove Tangible Economic Job Loss in Sexual Harassment Claims Brought
Under Title VII, 9 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 907 (1982); Note, supra note 48.
102. Bundy, 641 F.2d at 950.
103. 682 F.2d 897 (1th Cir. 1982).
104. Id. at 899-900.
105. Id. at 902.
106. Id. at 905.
107. Id. at 911-12.
108. Id. at 910.
109. Id. Federal courts are in agreement that the knowledge standard applies in cases in
which an employee is sexually harassed by a coworker. See, e.g., Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th
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When the supervisor conditions continued employment and promotion
on submission to sexual demands, however, he is acting in an official capac-
ity.110 Because the employer clothed the supervisor with the authority to
make quidpro quo harassment possible, the employer is strictly liable for
abuses of that authority. As the court noted, "Because the supervisor is acting
within at least the apparent scope of the authority entrusted to him by the
employer when he makes employment decisions, his conduct can fairly be im-
puted to the source of his authority."" I
This bifurcated standard was recently adopted by the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit in Katz v. Dole. 112 Katz was an air traffic controller for
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The only female employee on
her particular work shift, Katz was subjected to continual sexual harassment
by her coworkers and her supervisor." 3 She complained about the harass-
ment to the supervisior, but his response was further harassment.'14 Her com-
plaints to higher level management were ignored. 1 5 She requested a transfer
to another shift, but was informed by the supervisor of that shift that the trans-
fer could be arranged only in exchange for sexual favors. 116 Katz was fired in
1981 for participating in the air traffic controllers strike against the FAA.
117
The Katz court, reversing the district court, held that an offensive work
environment existed in the FAA control room." 8 Relying on Henson, the
court treated the offensive conduct by Katz's coworkers and supervisor under
the knowledge standard of liability: "We believe that in a 'condition of work
case' the plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer had actual or construc-
tive knowledge of the existence of a sexually hostile working environment and
took no prompt and adequate remedial action.'119
Again relying on Henson, the court also held that "[w]here the plaintiff's
complaint is of quid pro quo harassment by supervisory personnel, the em-
Cir. 1983); Kyriaza v. Western Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894 (D.N.J. 1978), aId, 647 F.2d 388 (3d
Cir. 1981); Smith v. Rust Eng'g Co., 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1172 (N.D. Ala. 1978). This
standard is also used to determine employer liability for coworkers' acts of racial and ethnic har-
assment. See, e.g., DeGrace v. Rumsfeld, 614 F.2d 796 (1st Cir. 1980); Friend v. Leidinger, 588
F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1978).
110. Henson, 682 F.2d at 910.
111. Id.
112. 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983). Three federal district courts also have adopted the Henson
standard. See Cummings v. Walsh Const. Co., 561 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ga. 1983) (complaint
stated cause of action under Henson by alleging employer was aware of an offensive work envi-
ronment but failed to provide a remedy); Ferguson v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 560 F.
Supp. 1172 (D. Del. 1983) (company not liable, under both Henson and Tomkins, for an offensive
work environment created by a supervisor because senior management promptly investigated and
ended the harassment); Conley v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 561 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Mich. 1982)
(court expressly adopted Henson and rejected the EEOC guidelines in finding an employer liable
for failing to correct offensive work environment after receiving notice).
113. Katz, 709 F.2d at 253.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 255 n.6.
117. Id. at 253.
118. Id. at 256.
119. Id. at 255.
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ployer is strictly liable."' 20 The court found that Katz had stated a claim for
quidpro quo harassment by alleging that a supervisor had demanded sexual
favors in exchange for a transfer to his shift. The court declined to adjudicate
this claim, however, because Katz had stated a sufficient claim for condition of
work harassment and would prevail on that claim.
12 1
Katz is the most recent addition to the appellate case law concerning an
employer's Title VII liability for on-the-job sexual harassment. The court
adopted the Henson bifurcated standard, but did not present any arguments
for doing so. The court simply articulated the standard and cited Henson and
Bundy as authority.122 It did not discuss the different standards adopted in
Miller and Tompkins, nor were these cases cited in the opinion. The Katz
court viewed Henson as the correct trend in Title VII sexual harassment cases
and perceived no need to consider the two older standards.1
23
The underlying assumptions of the bifurcated standard are that supervi-
sory harassment exists in two distinct forms, quidpro quo harassment and of-
fensive work condition harassment, and that the fairest and most effective
standard of liability must be assigned to each form, even at the expense of
uniformity.' 24 This distinction between these two forms must be valid for the
bifurcated standard to have merit.
A careful analysis of the two types of sexual harassment reveals that this
distinction between quidpro quo and offensive work environment harassment
is justified. In quidpro quo harassment the supervisor is using his authority as
supervisor to secure submission to his demands. 125 Without this express use of
authority, the quidpro quo would be meaningless. A nonsupervisory em-
ployee would be unable to effect harassment of this type because he lacks the
supervisor's ability to retaliate if his demands are not met. In contrast, a non-
supervisory employee is fully capable of creating an offensive work environ-
ment. In this type of harassment, the ability to harass is a function of the
proximity of the victim to the harasser. 126 Supervisory authority plays no role;
the supervisor and the coworker are equally capable of effecting such
harassment.
It has been argued that the employee-victim may feel compelled to toler-
ate an offensive work environment created by a supervisor to a greater extent
than one imposed by a coworker.' 2 7 The employee may decline to complain
about the offensive behavior, either to the supervisor directly or to higher
management, because of intimidation or fear of reprisal by the supervisor. If
so, the supervisor may be more successful with offensive work environment
120. Id. at 255 n.6.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 255.
123. Id.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 109-11.
125. E.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (1Ith Cir. 1982).
126. E.g.,id. at 905.
127. Comment, supra note 48, at 544.
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harassment than a coworker could. 128 The supervisor, however, is creating the
hostile environment without express use of his power as supervisor. His ability
to harass still depends on his proximity to the victim, rather than on his status
in the work place. Furthermore, if the supervisor actually threatens reprisal,
the situation is no longer limited to an offensive work environment, but has
evolved into quidpro quo harassment. 129 An offensive work environment, by
itself, lacks the threatened use of authority and offical action found in quidpro
quo harassment.
This basic difference between the two forms of harassment warrants ana-
lyzing each form separately to determine the appropriate standards of liability.
Such analysis establishes that, for policy reasons, quidpro quo harassment jus-
tifies imposing strict liability, while offensive work environment harassment
should be subject to the knowledge standard.
The first policy rationale relates to the nature of the threat posed by each
type of harassment. Quid pro quo harassment confronts the victim with the
more serious threat: the risk of employment sanctions, such as termination,
demotion, or denial of promotion. This immediate threat is absent in an of-
fensive work environment; although such an environment is certainly unpleas-
ant, the employee's employment continues uninterrupted and unthreatened.
130
Because quidpro quo harassment poses a more serious threat, the victim needs
the stronger protection of strict liability.
Strict liability for quidpro quo harassment is further justified because the
employer creates the supervisory authority that makes such harassment possi-
ble. Quidpro quo harassment involves an official act by the supervisor when
deciding to fire, demote, or deny promotion to the victim. The employer
vested the supervisor with the authority to perform this official act and, conse-
quently, should be liable for misuse of that authority.
131
Finally, strict liability would help prevent acts of quidpro quo harassment
from occurring. Because the authority to effect quid pro quo harassment is
derived from the employer, the employer is also in a stronger position to pre-
vent such harassment by prudent regulation of that authority. The employer
can detect and correct any retaliatory employment decision made by a super-
visor as part of a quidpro quo harassment scheme by requiring documentation
of the supervisor's rationale and by subjecting the decision to review by
higher-level management. Strict liability would give the employee the requi-
site incentive to create these safeguards. Faced with the imposition of liability
128. Id.
129. See, ag., Cummings v. Walsh Const. Co., 561 F. Supp. 872, 878-79 (S.D. Ga. 1983) (su-
pervisor created a quidpro quo by retaliating against an employee who reported to higher man-
agement supervisor's sexual advances). See also Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568
F.2d 1044, 1045 (3d Cir. 1977).
130. InBundy, for example, the employee still was fully employed at the time she brought suit.
Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
131. Under traditional agency law, a master is liable for the unauthorized torts of the servant
when the agency relationship assists the servant in the commission of the tort. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1958).
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upon occurrence of the quidpro quo, the employer would have a strong self-
interest to ensure it never occurs.
These policies supporting strict liability are inapplicable to offensive work
environment harassment. No official action is involved in creating an offen-
sive work environment and the employer lacks the opportunities to create in-
ternal safeguards. At best, the employer can articulate a vigorous policy
against sexual harassment and provide an effective procedure to report and
resolve any violations. 132 The initiative to report such violations, however,
remains with the employee; any procedure, however well designed, will re-
main ineffective unless the employee chooses to use it. Because an employer
depends on notification by the employee before it can remedy an offensive
work environment, strict liability for such harassment would place an undue
burden on the employer. Unlike the quidpro quo situation, strict liability
would subject the employer to liabilities for events over which it can exert little
prior control. The knowledge standard avoids this undue burden since liabil-
ity is not imposed unless the employer has notice of the harassment and subse-
quently refuses to provide a remedy.
Under this policy analysis, strict liability emerges as the appropriate stan-
dard of liability for supervisory quidpro quo, while the knowledge standard is
better suited for offensive work environment harassment. Although this bifur-
cated standard is not consistent with other Title VII causes of action, sexual
harassment is a unique form of discrimination and warrants this separate anal-
ysis and treatment.
This unique treatment of sexual harassment can be reconciled with the
language of Title VII. 133 The bifurcated standard imposes liability on the em-
ployer for the discriminatory acts of its agents, as required by Title VII,1 34
when that agent is acting in the course of his agency. If the supervisor uses the
power of his agency to effect the harassment, the bifurcated standard imposes
strict liability on the employer. When the supervisor makes no such use of this
power, however, as in an offensive work environment, he is no longer acting as
an agent and strict liability is not required.
The bifurcated test applied in Henson and Katz is derived from sound
analysis of on-the-job sexual harassment and represents the better rule. In
cases of quidpro quo harassment, strict liability clearly is warranted. The em-
ployer created the supervisory authority and, hence, is held liable for its mis-
use. Strict liability would not impose an undue burden on the employer
because the employer itself possesses the means to control incidents of quidpro
quo harassment through appropriate safeguards. Strict liability, moreover,
would encourage employers to create such safeguards, and would give em-
ployees needed protection from this form of sexual harassment.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 89-90.
133. One argument advanced against this unique approach is that the language in Title VII
mandates strict liability in all cases of supervisory harassment. See supra text accompanying notes
58-60.
134. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976).
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In cases of offensive work environment harassment, however, strict liabil-
ity would not serve any policy or enforcement objective. No official action is
involved in such harassment, eliminating the possibility of prior internal re-
view by the employer. Thus, the employer is entitled to notice so that he can
correct the situation. The knowledge standard provides such notice.
The bifurcated approach allows a reasoned analysis of each incident of
sexual harassment and responds effectively, while avoiding the inequities that
can occur under the pure strict liability and pure knowledge standards. Be-
cause a national standard of liability is essential for effective protection against
supervisory sexual harassment, courts should follow the Eleventh and Fourth
Circuits by adopting the bifurcated standard.
DAVID J. BURGE
